Nathanael Greene quotes - page 5
We had a very respectable force, as to numbers; between eight and nine thousand, rank and file, upon the ground; but of these we attempted to select a particular corps to possess ourselves of the enemy's lines, partly by force, and partly by stratagem; but w r e could not make up the necessary number that was thought sufficient to warrant the attempt, which was five thousand, including the Continental and State troops. This body was to consist of men, who had been in actual service before, not less than nine months. However, the men were not to be had, and, if they could have been found, there was more against it than for it. Colonel Laurens was to have opened the passage by landing within the enemy's lines, and getting possession of a redoubt at the head of Easton's beach. If we had failed in the attempt, the whole party must have fallen a sacrifice, for their situation would have been such that there was no possibility of getting off.
Nathanael Greene
Our strength is now reduced from nine thousand to between four and five thousand. All our heavy cannon on garrison carriages, and heavy and superfluous stores of every kind, are removed to the main, and to the north end of the Island, where we intend to intrench and attempt to hold it, and wait the chance of events. General Hancock is gone to Boston to forward the repairs of the fleet, and to prepare the mind of the Count for a speedy return. How far he will succeed, I cannot pretend to say. I think it a matter of some doubt yet, whether the enemy will reenforce, or take off this garrison. If they expect a superior fleet from Europe, they will reenforce; but, if not, they will remove the garrison.
Nathanael Greene
We soon put the enemy to the rout, and I had the pleasure to see them run in worse disorder than they did at the battle of Monniouth. Our troops behaved with great spirit; and the brigade of militia, under the command of General Lovell, advanced with great resolution and in good order, and stood the fire of the enemy with great firmness. Lieutenant-Colonel Livingston, Colonel Jackson, and Colonel Henry B. Livingston, did themselves great honor in the transactions of the day; but it's not in my power to do justice to Colonel Laurens, who acted both the General and the partisan. His command of regular troops was small, but he did every thing possible to be done by their numbers. He had two most excellent officers with him, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry and Major Talbot.
Nathanael Greene
In the choice of a position, we must pay some regard to the enemy's collected force, and to our divided condition, in which the army must of necessity be cantoned. The enemy now appear to be putting their troops into winter-quarters; but it cannot be supposed they will remain inactive all winter, if we, by the manner of cantoning the army, open to them an opportunity of insulting us to advantage. The mischievous consequences of having our quarters beat up, in the dead of winter, cannot readily be foreseen. That it would be their duty and interest to lay hold of such an opportunity, nobody can deny; and that the character of the General, and many national circumstances, lead to the supposition, must be agreed to. It is necessary, therefore, to take a position which will secure us from a surprise, and have as much force together as possible, to free us from insult. The place where, and the force necessary, to these ends, are the two capital points to decide upon.
Nathanael Greene
Your Excellency will find, after detaching a proper force for this place, a covering party for the State of Connecticut, and the other necessary guards for King's Ferry, stores, and posts of communication, your force will be greatly inferior to that of the enemy; and it will be growing more and more so as the service of the soldiers expires. It will be necessary, therefore, to endeavour to remedy, by the strength of ground, the deficiency of force.
Nathanael Greene
There is another objection to the Suffern's or Pompton position, which is, the advantage it gives the enemy of dividing our attention, by taking post at King's Ferry. It will be impossible for us to deter mine which is their object, the camp or West Point; and it will be almost as dangerous to expose our camp as these garrisons, especially early in the spring, when we have all our baggage about us, and no possibility of moving it off. If we take a position near Morris, we can always tell, by the motions of the enemy, what is their object; and, having our camp in a secure situation, should they turn their force to wards this place, we can march to its relief in such force as to give certain support, and at the same time leave our camp in perfect security.
Nathanael Greene